Can All Murders Be “Aggravated?” A Look at Aggravating Factor Capital-Eligibility Schemes by Ash, Tyler
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 63 
Number 4 Childress Lecture--Exploring 
#STL2039: Policies for a Better Future (Summer 
2019) 
Article 8 
2019 
Can All Murders Be “Aggravated?” A Look at Aggravating Factor 
Capital-Eligibility Schemes 
Tyler Ash 
tyler.ash@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tyler Ash, Can All Murders Be “Aggravated?” A Look at Aggravating Factor Capital-Eligibility Schemes, 63 
St. Louis U. L.J. (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol63/iss4/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
641 
CAN ALL MURDERS BE “AGGRAVATED?” A LOOK AT 
AGGRAVATING FACTOR CAPITAL-ELIGIBILITY SCHEMES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to the Supreme Court, a constitutional capital sentencing scheme 
must provide a way to “genuinely narrow” the class of those eligible for the 
death penalty and must “reasonably justify” imposing a more severe sentence 
compared to others found guilty of murder.1 This stems from the Court’s 
decision in Furman v. Georgia that a death sentence was unconstitutional when 
it was applied only to “a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the 
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”2 Death sentences are to be reserved 
for the “worst of the worst” offenders (i.e. only those most deserving of 
execution).3 States are therefore required to define death-eligible crimes in a way 
that avoids “standardless [sentencing] discretion.”4 In order to keep their capital 
sentencing schemes constitutional, states have adopted systems of “aggravating” 
and “mitigating” factors which are designed to ensure that death sentences are 
actually imposed on only the most deserving of offenders.5 “This means that if 
a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional 
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and 
capricious infliction of the death penalty.”6 
While the Supreme Court has previously approved of this framework, 
systems of aggravating factors have created new problems. Previously, the 
Supreme Court has held that a sentencing scheme is unconstitutional if an 
individual aggravating factor is overbroad or vague.7 Overbroad or vague factors 
are problematic because, due to their vagueness or breadth, it is possible that 
nearly all murders could fall within their grasp. Therefore, they cannot serve to 
 
 1. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876–77 (1983). 
 2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 3. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]ithin the category 
of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst.’”). See also Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“Thus, 
pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of 
execution are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.”). 
 4. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). 
 5. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 6. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428. 
 7. Id. (finding that a statutory aggravating factor showing that a murder was “outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” did not restrain arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty). 
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“genuinely narrow” the class of death-eligible persons to only “the worst of the 
worst.” 
Several state statutory aggravating factor schemes as a whole should also 
run afoul of Furman for the same reasons that individual factors have failed. 
Because overly-broad aggravator schemes capture nearly all actually-occurring 
murders, they fail to sufficiently narrow the death eligible class, fail to suitably 
direct sentence discretion, and fail to justify death sentences as proportionate 
punishments for the crimes committed (i.e. the aggravators might not reserve 
death for the “worst of the worst”). For these three reasons, they are 
unconstitutional in their current state. The remainder of this paper will proceed 
in two parts. Part II looks at the reason for implementation of state statutory 
aggravating factor schemes after the Supreme Court handed down Furman and 
will consider the attributes of these statutory schemes that help the statutes 
address the Court’s concerns in Furman. Part III argues that the current state of 
statutory aggravating factors, and the view of them taken by courts, fails to 
satisfy the concerns originally raised by Furman. 
II.  STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTOR SCHEMES POST-FURMAN 
Statutory aggravator schemes are a means to an end, not an end in 
themselves. They were brought about by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Furman v. Georgia, which rendered invalid state capital sentencing schemes in 
1972.8 In Furman, each of the nine justices wrote separately, underscoring both 
the importance and controversial nature of the opinion.9 While Justices 
Douglas10 and Brennan11 would have invalidated the death penalty entirely, the 
other three concurring opinions left the door open for a constitutionally 
permissible implementation. These other three narrower opinions—the ones 
which struck existing death penalty statutes while allowing for the possibility of 
a constitutionally permissible death penalty—are typically thought of as the core 
holding of Furman. 
In his concurrence, Justice White was more concerned with an empirical 
stylized fact about the death penalty’s use. He noted that death sentences could 
be imposed so infrequently that the penalty itself would cease to contribute to 
any permissible end of the criminal justice system.12 If a penalty is seldom 
imposed, it would fail to act as a credible deterrent. Likewise, it is unlikely that 
society’s retributive needs are satisfied by a punishment which is infrequently 
implemented. “[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for 
the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
 
 8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
 9. Id. at 240. 
 10. Id. at 370–71 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
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the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”13 
Presumably, a “meaningful basis” must also be a constitutionally permissible 
one. Although he does not say so in Furman, it seems likely that Justice White 
would have permitted a capital punishment scheme in which a greater proportion 
of a given death-eligible class actually received the penalty. Indeed, Justice 
White’s dissent in Woodson confirmed this point.14 Theoretically, the concern 
that death sentences are too infrequent could be accomplished either by 
increasing the absolute number of executions or by limiting the class of 
offenders eligible for death in the first place. 
While Justice Stewart accepted that the ability to sentence at least some 
criminals to death was necessary for the purpose of retribution,15 he voted to 
overturn death sentences which were “cruel” because they went excessively 
beyond punishments that state legislatures had determined were necessary, and 
“unusual” because of the rarity of death sentences for both murder (“infrequently 
imposed”) and rape (“extraordinarily rare”).16 Justice Stewart also suspected that 
the race of the defendants played a role in the imposition of the death sentence 
in Furman.17 Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion thus shows a concern for 
guiding sentencing discretion, such that the race of the defendant or victim was 
not determinative of whether a death sentence was imposed. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in other capital cases shed additional light 
on some of the Court’s overarching concerns. The Court has expressed concern 
about the “arbitrary and capricious” implementation of the death penalty.18 The 
Court has noted that even for those crimes which deserve a sentence of death, 
the penalty itself is infrequently imposed.19 Because the Court was primarily 
concerned about the arbitrary and infrequent imposition of the death penalty, the 
 
 13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (White, J., concurring). 
 14. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 307 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“I reject 
petitioners’ arguments that the death penalty in any circumstances is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 15. Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The instinct for retribution is part of 
the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an 
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to 
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the 
punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, 
and lynch law.”). 
 16. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the first place, it is clear that these sentences are 
‘cruel’ in the sense that they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that 
the state legislatures have determined to be necessary.”). 
 17. Id. at 310. 
 18. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“Because of the uniqueness of the death 
penalty . . . it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that 
it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”). 
 19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with 
great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”). 
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Court set out requirements that a valid capital sentencing scheme must establish. 
A valid capital sentencing scheme must provide a way to “genuinely narrow” 
the class of those eligible for the death penalty and must “reasonably justify” 
imposing a more severe sentence compared to others found guilty of murder.20 
Death sentences are to be reserved for offenders “most deserving of execution”21 
where the defendant has been found to have committed one or more statutory 
aggravating factors.22 
To accomplish this task, states turned to statutory aggravating factor 
schemes, which were upheld by the Court in Gregg v. Georgia.23 The statutory 
provision at issue in Gregg set out ten aggravating factors, at least one of which 
must have been found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury before a 
sentence of death could be imposed.24 The Supreme Court approved of 
Georgia’s updated safeguards, stating: 
These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and 
the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as 
Furman’s jury did: reach a finding of the defendant’s guilt and then, without 
guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die.25 
It is clear from Gregg’s language that the Court viewed its decision in terms of 
alleviating the concerns raised by Furman.26 
The Supreme Court’s case law sets out several requirements that a 
constitutional capital sentencing scheme must meet in determining whether a 
defendant is eligible for a death sentence. First, the defendant must have 
committed one or more aggravating factors in addition to the murder.27 
Aggravating factors are statutorily defined, either in the definition of the crime 
or in a separate sentencing factor.28 Aggravating factors themselves must meet 
the separate requirements of applying only to a subclass of defendants, and not 
being unconstitutionally vague.29 This means that each factor must apply to less 
than the entire population of defendants, and also that an individual factor must 
be specific enough so as to be readily identifiable. As such, the aggravating 
 
 20. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876–77 (1983). 
 21. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 22. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). 
 23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07 (“No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the 
death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review 
function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that 
prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure 
applied here.”). 
 24. Id. at 196–97. 
 25. Id. at 197. 
 26. See id. at 206–07 (contrasting the newly-upheld Georgia sentencing procedures against 
those overturned in Furman). 
 27. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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factors are designed to limit the death-eligible class of offenders to only those 
most deserving of the punishment. Second, statutory aggravating factor schemes 
must suitably limit the sentencer’s discretion, in order to “distinguish [a 
particular] case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases 
in which it was not.”30 Third, the defendant must have been convicted of a crime 
for which the punishment of death is proportionate.31 In summary, statutory 
aggravating factor schemes are designed to do three things: genuinely narrow 
the death-eligible class of offenders; suitably direct the fact finder’s discretion; 
and justify the proportionality of the punishment. 
A. Valid Capital Sentencing Schemes Must Perform a Limiting Function 
A common metaphor to help visualize the role that the aggravating factor 
system is supposed to play is to imagine a pyramid. The pyramid is divided into 
several layers, and a capital case can be imagined to proceed upward through the 
layers. At the base layer is the population of cases for which the defendant was 
found guilty of murder. The next layer is the “eligibility phase” in which a 
statutory aggravator must be found by the jury. If at least one aggravator is 
found, the case moves upward to the next level, the “sentencing phase” where a 
jury may consider mitigating evidence in addition to the aggravators and must 
ultimately decide whether to impose a death sentence against the capital 
defendant. At the pinnacle is the so-called “worst of the worst” who have been 
sentenced to death and are executed. 
The point of thinking about the system this way is that every level contains 
less area than the one immediately below it. The system is imagined this way to 
drive home the point that each “level” in the process is doing some narrowing 
work towards the ultimate goal of identifying the worst offenders who are most 
deserving of death. Juries need not consider weighing capital aggravators and 
mitigators if the defendant is not even death-eligible. Courts need not worry if a 
defendant is death-eligible if he has not committed a crime for which death is 
even an available punishment. By narrowing out defendants at each level, the 
system should function to ensure that only the most deserving of death, i.e. those 
who pass through each level of the pyramid up to the top, receive death 
sentences. To the extent that an actual system resembles a pyramid, narrowing 
work is being done at each level. If, for example, one level contains exactly as 
many murders as the level below it, it is not doing any work to narrow the class 
of death-eligible offenders and must be looked upon with suspicion. There is no 
point in having a filter which does no filtering. 
 
 30. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (“[I]t ‘is of vital importance to the defendant 
and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based 
on reason rather than caprice or emotion.’” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 
(1977)). 
 31. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971. 
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In order to be constitutionally permissible, “a capital sentencing scheme 
must ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.’”32 
Despite the requirement that the death-eligible class is “genuinely narrow[ed]” 
by the entire capital sentencing scheme,33 cases that focus on this requirement 
have only applied the analysis to individual aggravators, not systems of 
aggravators.34 This is an important distinction, as courts have utilized it to reject 
challenges based on the idea that aggravating factor schemes do no narrowing.35 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this sort of analysis suggests that a state is 
free to adopt a seemingly limitless number of individual aggravators that would 
capture substantially all murders as death-eligible murders, provided that each 
individual aggravating factor applies to only a subclass of defendants and is not 
itself unconstitutionally vague. In this instance, the scope of each individual 
aggravator matters while the overall scope of the aggravating factor scheme does 
not. This is an absurd result which frustrates the purpose of having a death-
eligible step in the analysis at all. To limit scrutiny to only overly-broad 
individual aggravators while ignoring patchwork collections of aggravators 
which lead to the exact same result is to ignore the Supreme Court’s original 
concerns in Furman. It is equivalent to establishing a legally significant 
distinction between a blanket and a quilt based solely on the arbitrary fact that a 
quilt is made up of many different pieces of cloth stitched together while a 
blanket is not. However trivial this example might seem, for the capital 
defendant, the formalistic and capricious distinction between “blanket” and 
“quilt” in this instance is the very real difference between life and death. 
The narrowing requirement is rooted in the idea that an aggravating factor 
scheme should do some actual lifting in determining which offenders should at 
least be eligible for a death sentence and which should not. Some commentators 
have suggested that what is actually required is conceptual narrowing rather than 
 
 32. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 
877 (1983)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 967 (“First, the circumstance may not apply to every 
defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of 
murder. Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague.”); Godfrey, 
446 U.S. at 420; Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) (“If the sentencer fairly could conclude 
that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the 
circumstance is constitutionally infirm.”); State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 790–91 (Ariz. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1054 (2018). (“Discussions of ‘narrowing’ challenges to death penalty 
statutes may involve two different questions: (1) whether a particular aggravator applies to fewer 
than all murders; and (2) whether the scheme overall ‘is neutral and principled so as to guard against 
bias or caprice[.]’”) (quoting Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972–73). 
 35. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d at 790 (holding that petitioner’s argument that Arizona’s aggravating 
factor scheme is unconstitutional fails because the Supreme Court’s case law suggests that only the 
individual factors must apply to subclasses of defendants, not the scheme as a whole). 
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empirical narrowing.36 However, this line of reasoning has been described by 
other commentators as “willfully blind to empiricism,”37 and there are many 
instances of courts making empirical examinations within the capital sentencing 
context.38 Here, conceptual narrowing means that an aggravating factor scheme 
is only unconstitutional if it is a logical impossibility that any first-degree murder 
could not also be a capital murder.39 This could be accomplished in a system 
with as few as two aggravating factors: “X,” and “not X.” Under such a system, 
every murder necessarily meets one of these circumstances. Either “X” was 
satisfied, or if it was not, “not X” was satisfied. In either case, and in all possible 
cases, the offender is death-eligible. Such a scheme, the argument goes, does not 
“genuinely narrow” the death-eligible class because of the analytical 
relationship between the two aggravators (i.e. that they are mutually exclusive). 
This is in contrast to an “empirical narrowing” idea, which would require that 
the actual number of death-eligible offenders is less than the number of first-
degree murder offenders.40 
However, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”41 
The “conceptual narrowing” approach described above is especially strange 
given that the Supreme Court has used empirical data in evaluating death penalty 
challenges ever since Furman.42 The various opinions in Furman together 
suggest that, at the time Georgia’s death penalty scheme was found to be 
unconstitutional, only fifteen to twenty percent of capital-eligible defendants 
were sentenced to death.43 Further, Gregg considered that if a jury was willing 
 
 36. See Chad Flanders, Is Having Too Many Aggravating Factors the Same as Having None 
at All?: A Comment on the Hidalgo Cert. Petition, 51 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 49, 56–58 
(October 2017). Professor Flanders has recently endeavored to differentiate “intrinsic” arbitrariness 
having to do with the category of crime or criminal (e.g., giving the death penalty to someone who 
is less deserving of it while sparing someone more deserving of it) and “extrinsic” arbitrariness 
(getting the death penalty based on “where you commit the crime, what the prosecutor decides, 
what your race is, or who you lawyer is.”). Chad Flanders, What Makes the Death Penalty 
Arbitrary? (And Does It Matter If It Is?), 2019 WISC. L.R. 55, 59–60. 
 37. John Mills, How to Assess the Real World Application of a Capital Sentencing Statute: A 
Response to Professor Flanders’s Comment, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 77, 79 (October 
2017). 
 38. Id. at 87–88. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 42. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing 
petitioners’ version of empirical evidence as a “different body of empirical evidence”); id. at 364, 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 
were white and 2,066 were Negro. Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed 
murderers were white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, 
were executed for rape. It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than 
whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”). See also Mills, supra note 37 at 87. 
 43. Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11 (C.J. Burger, dissenting); Mills, supra note 37 at 83. 
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to issue death sentences in a greater proportion of cases, this would be 
constitutionally permissible:  
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed become 
more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are particularly serious or 
for which the death penalty is particularly appropriate as they are in Georgia by 
reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to 
expect that juries—even given discretion not to impose the death penalty—will 
impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they 
do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and 
freakishly or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.44 
The chief concern in Furman was that the death penalty was too infrequently 
used to be justified (i.e. the fraction of death sentences over total death-eligible 
defendants was too small). A possible solution to this problem comes in one of 
two flavors: Either increase the numerator (more death sentences) or reduce the 
denominator (decrease the death-eligible class). The second way necessarily 
requires a way to empirically limit the number of death eligible offenders rather 
than a hollow, conceptual form of narrowing. At bottom, this is an empirical, 
rather than a conceptual, argument. 
Within the body of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, the 
Court has not hesitated to reason empirically when considering questions 
regarding the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and usual 
punishment. The court has relied on “indicia of consensus” as to the 
permissibility of making a crime punishable by death. Such indicia include 
taking surveys of the numbers of states which have acted to invalidate the death 
penalty in certain instances45 and gauging the trend of legislatures in moving 
away from applying death to minors46 and defendants with intellectual 
disabilities.47 The court has also relied on numerous studies, reports, and 
manuals identifying reasons for the lessened culpability of minors,48 and fine-
tuning thresholds for intelligence tests used in identifying intellectually disabled 
defendants49 in which the empirical findings were key to the Court’s ultimate 
decision. 
If the Court were concerned only with conceptual narrowing, there would 
be no need to refer to the proportion of death sentences actually carried out, nor 
the number of states which employ certain aspects of capital punishment, nor to 
 
 44. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
 45. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422–24 (2008) (invalidating death sentence for rape 
of a child based in part on a survey of current state practices). 
 46. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–66 (2005). 
 47. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–16 (2002). 
 48. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (pointing out various scientific and sociological studies proffered 
by defendant and amici). 
 49. Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1993 
(2014). 
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the physiological or intellectual metrics used in determining why youth or the 
intellectually disabled are less culpable than other defendants. By focusing on 
empirical metrics, the Court implicitly reasons in an empirical, not strictly 
conceptual, manner. 
B. Valid Capital Sentencing Schemes Must Direct Sentencing Discretion 
If the aggravating factors are not doing any real work to limit the death-
eligible class, this limiting work must be done by either juries or prosecutors. 
Failing to suitably direct juries’ discretion is a specific concern. Less attention 
has been paid to the ability or willingness of prosecutors to bring capital charges, 
but this is obviously an important consideration as well. The specific concerns 
in each case differ, but the overarching concern is that too much discretion 
afforded to juries or prosecutors will lead to miscarriages of justice. In a situation 
where the defendant is potentially subjected to the ultimate punishment, the risk 
of jurors or prosecutors exercising uncontrolled discretion is unacceptable. 
Because the death-eligible class is not sufficiently limited, it is less likely 
that the discretion of juries is meaningfully directed in any way. Juries’ exercise 
of discretion is a recurring theme in the Supreme Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence.50 The harsher punishment of death is not justified by a system 
which both fails to appropriately limit the death eligible class and fails to 
appropriately direct the sentencer’s discretion. One comprehensive study of 240 
juror interviews across fifty-eight cases suggests that topics focused on by jurors 
at the sentencing phase revolve primarily around questions of guilt.51 “The jurors 
do not appear to have grappled with the notion that, despite the defendant’s clear 
guilt of an aggravated murder, they could decide that he deserved a sentence 
other than death.”52 The same study also notes that a substantial proportion of 
jurors who voted for death sentences believed that under the law a death sentence 
was required, as opposed to merely available.53 Jurors also seem to ignore 
potential mitigating evidence; mitigating evidence was infrequently discussed 
and some jurors viewed the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence as 
opposed to a death sentence as “excusing” the defendant for the crime.54 
Prosecutors also play a role in exercising their discretion when the statutory 
scheme does not sufficiently limit the death-eligible class. Of course, 
prosecutorial discretion will always have some role in our criminal justice 
 
 50. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 991–92 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
461, 483–484 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983); Gregg 
v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). 
 51. Ursula Bentele and William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is 
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK L. REV. 
1011, 1029–30 (2001). 
 52. Id. at 1031. 
 53. Id. at 1041. 
 54. Id. at 1052–53. 
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system; it would be impossible and misguided to completely eliminate the 
discretion of those persons actually trying criminal cases in court. However, the 
ability and willingness of prosecutors to seek death sentences is a particularly 
powerful use of that discretion and must be vigilantly monitored. This is 
especially true where statutory aggravator schemes do not sufficiently limit the 
class of defendants against whom prosecutors can bring capital charges. 
One symptom of insufficiently-guided prosecutorial discretion are the 
county-level discrepancies with respect to death sentences. In his dissent in 
Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer called for a renewed examination of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty by pointing to several studies which show 
that geography is a factor which can explain death sentences.55 One of the cited 
studies shows that only ten percent of all counties in the United States accounted 
for all death sentences imposed from 2004 to 2009.56 Additionally, one percent 
of counties accounted for nearly forty-four percent of all death sentences from 
2004 to 2009.57 Several possible reasons have been suggested for this disparity, 
including overzealous prosecuting58 and the cost of mounting a capital case.59 
Whatever the reasons, the fact that a small subset of counties brings substantially 
all death penalty cases is indicative of a broken system. The imposition of death 
based on the defendant’s geography is wanton and freakish. 
Further, the factors which best explain whether a defendant will face a death 
sentence are themselves arbitrary, capricious, and unjust. The various opinions 
in Furman contained some bare-bones statistics on execution rates, but nothing 
more substantial. Since Furman, however, the number of statistical studies has 
exploded, and their conclusions are alarming.60  
One of the most notable uses of statistical data in a death penalty case came 
in McCleskey.61 In McCleskey, the petitioner’s death sentence was upheld 
despite a comprehensive statistical study (the Baldus study) indicating the 
presence of racial bias in Georgia’s death penalty machinery.62 A four-justice 
 
 55. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2761–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 56. Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 227, 233 (2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Too Broken to Fix: Part I: An In-depth Look at America’s Outlier Death Penalty Counties, 
Report, Fair Punishment Project, http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FPP-Too 
Broken.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2S9-H28F] (last visited January 22, 2019). 
 59. Maurice Chammah, Six Reasons the Death Penalty is Becoming More Expensive, Report, 
The Marshall Project (2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/17/six-reasons-the-
death-penalty-is-becoming-more-expensive [https://perma.cc/H32C-R49R] (last visited January 
22, 2019). 
 60. See generally Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 
(2013). 
 61. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 62. Id. at 292. 
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dissent noted that few facts were more relevant to McCleskey’s ultimate 
sentence than that his victim was white: defendants charged with killing white 
victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence than those whose 
victims were black.63 
However, the majority opinion maintained that the showing of a correlation 
between race and the death penalty was “at most . . . a discrepancy that 
appear[ed] to correlate with race”64 and that “[a]pparent discrepancies in 
sentencing are . . . inevitable.”65 This decision was derided by commentators as 
akin to Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu v. United 
States.66 Nevertheless, the majority refused to descend what they saw as a 
slippery slope:  
Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar 
claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests 
on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based 
on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority 
groups, and even to gender.67 
Since McCleskey, a number of other studies have shown similar results to 
the Baldus study.68 After reviewing a number of different studies, composed of 
various methodologies, time periods, and locations, the data reveal that while 
there is little to no racial disparity based on race of the defendant alone, there are 
statistically significant disparities based on race of the victim alone, and the 
disparity is even greater when based on the combination of race of defendant 
 
 63. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey 
doubtless asked his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this 
question would have been disturbing. First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the 
details of the crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important than the fact that 
his victim was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants 
charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as 
defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the disclosure that it 
was more likely than not that the race of McCleskey’s victim would determine whether he received 
a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white person would not have 
received the death penalty if their victims had been black, while, among defendants with 
aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would not have 
been sentenced to die if their victims had been black. Finally, the assessment would not be complete 
without the information that cases involving black defendants and white victims are more likely to 
result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant and victim. 
The story could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential 
narrative line: there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in determining 
if he lived or died.”). (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 312. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 60 at 1240. 
 67. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–17. 
 68. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 60 at 1244–56. 
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and race of victim.69 Further, gender disparities exist as well. Estimates suggest 
that a defendant who murders a female victim is approximately twice as likely 
to receive the death penalty than a defendant whose victim is male.70 
Even though the majority opinion in McCleskey rejected petitioner’s 
argument after assuming, arguendo, that the data from the Baldus study was 
true, this does not serve as a bar to the use of studies in death penalty cases. 
While the Court rejected McCleskey’s argument on the ground that he did not 
prove that he was purposefully discriminated against, this barrier may be 
weakened by a shift towards more recognized “disparate impact” theories of 
civil rights violations. Also, statutes passed since McCleskey give more force 
toward finding racial disparities in punishment as unconstitutional.71  
When aggravating factors schemes do not genuinely narrow the number of 
defendants in a way that identifies the most culpable, the task is left to juries and 
prosecutors. Without suitable direction, it appears that the decisions of jurors 
and prosecutors are affected by capricious factors such as race and geography.  
C. Valid Capital Sentencing Schemes Must Justify the Heightened 
Punishment 
States which retain the death penalty set out various aggravating factors, at 
least one of which must generally be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
for the defendant to be eligible for the death sentence. Aggravating factors are 
designed to help the trier of fact determine which defendants have committed a 
crime for which a proportionate sentence is death. In essence, aggravators are 
designed to filter out all but the “worst of the worst” offenders, who even then 
may still prevent mitigating evidence and ultimately may be excused from death 
at the mercy of the jury. Aggravating factors vary from state to state, but in 
general they be arranged under some standard categories.  
The first category concerns the manner in which the murder is committed. 
Examples of aggravators under this category typically come with descriptions 
such as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”72 or “committed in a cold, 
calculated manner.”73 Aggravators in this category can be susceptible to the 
prohibition against overly-vague aggravators in Godfrey unless they are given 
some limiting construction. This category also includes more specific 
aggravators such as “creat[ing] a grave risk of death”74 or if the murder occurred 
as a result of “the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other public 
 
 69. Id. at 1250. 
 70. Id. at 1251–52. 
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (enacted by Pub.L. 102-116, Title I, §101, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 
Stat. 1071). 
 72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(h) (2018). 
 73. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(f)(13) (2012). 
 74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(f)(3) (2012). 
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conveyance”75 or “knowingly creat[ing] a risk of death or great bodily harm to 
more than one person.”76 The emphasis here is on making these murderers 
death-eligible due to the particular violence against one person or potential for 
mass-murder. 
The second category of aggravators make capital-eligible murders which are 
reprehensible because of some attribute of the victim which makes the victim 
particularly vulnerable and unable to put up any resistance against the murderer. 
Aggravators in this category include the murder of “an unborn child in the 
womb,”77 someone “seventy years of age or older,”78 or someone “less than 14 
years of age.”79  
The third category of aggravators concern specific situations where 
incentives are important, such as the improper interference with the criminal 
justice system80 or murder-for-hire plots.81 Aggravators in this category are 
aimed toward increasing punishment for the murder of a person who could 
potentially play a role in a trial or who performs duties within the criminal justice 
system, while also providing counterbalancing disincentives for a uniquely 
incentivized version of murder that was done for pecuniary gain. 
The fourth category of aggravators deal with what can be thought of as 
“tack-ons” to the murder—namely instances of felony murder82 and instances 
where the defendant is a past-offender.83 While murders in this category are still 
reprehensible, and past offenders may be arguably more culpable, it can also be 
argued that it is unfair to extract additional punishment from a defendant for an 
offense for which he has already been sentenced, rehabilitated, and released. 
This does not allow the defendant a clean slate after he is released from his 
sentence. Further, allowing a statutory aggravator to be met based on actions 
allows for a punishment (death) greater than what the total punishment would 
be for each crime considered separately. However, these considerations must be 
weighed against a societal interest in curbing recidivism, especially of violent 
offenses. 
Disturbingly, some aggravators may not function to capture the murders 
whose perpetrators are more deserving of the heightened punishment of death. 
Arizona, for example, lists murders committed by the use of a remote stun gun 
 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2)(14). 
 76. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(4) (2015). 
 77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(f)(9) (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(10) (West 2017). 
 80. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(8-9) (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2)(12-
13). 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2)(4); A.C.A. § 5-4-604(6). 
 82. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2) (2012) (providing circumstances for felony 
murder as murder in the first degree in Arizona). 
 83. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6624(a) (West 2011). 
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as aggravated murders.84 Going beyond this one example, the fifth category of 
aggravators is more problematic than any of the others in that it contains an 
implicit racial component which is not saved by identifying any reason for the 
heightened culpability of the defendant. Examples of aggravating factors in this 
category include murders in connection with so-called “criminal street gang 
activity”85 or someone who is a “criminal gang member.”86 In actuality, it 
appears that these aggravators identify no real factor that justifies heightened 
culpability or the heightened punishment of death. Further, statutes of this sort 
may be susceptible to First Amendment freedom-of-association challenges or 
vagueness challenges.87 These provisions might function solely to ensnare 
members of minority groups, thereby transforming otherwise ordinary first-
degree murders into aggravated ones.88 This step from “ordinary” to 
“aggravated” can occur from a simple association with other persons, whether 
or not those persons were involved in the murder. 
While the most aggravating factors appear to be well thought-out and 
appropriately drafted, it seems that some aggravators function only to elevate 
some murders committed by minorities to aggravated murders, even if they are 
substantially the same as more ordinary murders. Even if these factors do not 
capture many murders, this does not justify keeping them on the books. A valid 
aggravator must identify a particular reason why a defendant in a particular case 
is deserving of the ultimate punishment.  
 
 84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(f)(14) (2012). 
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2)(17) (“The murder was committed during the commission 
of an offense which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activity as defined in section 
578.421.” MO. REV. STAT. § 578.421(1) defines a criminal street gang as “any ongoing 
organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as 
one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in 
subdivision (2) of this section, which has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, 
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity.”). 
 86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(n) (West 2017) (under FLA. STAT. ANN § 874.03 (West 
2017), a “criminal gang member is someone who meets any two or more of eleven different criteria, 
including “(d) Adop[ting] the style of dress of a criminal gang,” “(g) Associat[ing] with one or 
more known criminal gang members,” “(j) Has been observed in the company of one or more 
known criminal gang members four or more times.”). 
 87. H. Mitchell Caldwell & Daryl Fisher-Ogden, Stalking the Jets and the Sharks: Exploring 
the Constitutionality of the Gang Death Penalty Enhancer, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 601, 638–39 
(2004). 
 88. See Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement 
and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 223, 249–50 (2011). 
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III.  STATE CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEMES CURRENTLY FAIL TO ADDRESS 
FURMAN’S CONCERNS 
Courts have shown themselves to be very deferential to states and not since 
Furman has the Supreme Court held a capital sentencing scheme, taken as a 
whole, to be unconstitutional. As a result, unconstitutional capital sentencing 
schemes that fail to narrow the death-eligible class have proliferated. 
Indeed, since Furman, the Court has not considered the question of whether 
particular aggravating sentencing schemes, taken as a whole, are constitutional. 
Even cases which ask questions of individual aggravators do not extend this 
analysis to aggravating factor schemes as a whole.89 
A. Current Capital Sentencing Schemes Fail to Perform a Limiting Function 
Despite deciding several cases, which consider whether an individual 
aggravator is too broad or vague,90 the Supreme Court has not yet made a 
determination about whether a statutory scheme as a whole may fail to provide 
a sufficient amount of narrowing the death-eligible class.91 However, the Court’s 
own decisions explicitly state that the capital sentencing scheme as a whole, not 
merely any particular individual aggravating circumstance, must serve a 
narrowing function.92 To the extent that a state fails to sufficiently narrow the 
death-eligible class, it runs afoul of Furman. To insist that a single aggravating 
factor can be overbroad while a collection of aggravating factors that achieves 
the same result “genuinely narrows” the class is to place form over substance 
while lives hang in the balance. Just because the previous Supreme Court 
 
 89. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 981 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“As these cases 
come to us they present a question that the Court answered in Zant v. Stephens. California, like 
Georgia, has provided a procedure for determining whether a defendant found guilty of murder is 
eligible for the death penalty. Petitioners have not challenged the constitutionality of that procedure 
or its application in these cases. Accordingly, our decision rests on the same assumption that we 
made in Zant, namely, that the statutory procedure for determining eligibility adequately confines 
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty to a narrow category in which there is a special 
justification for ‘the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others 
found guilty of murder.’”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 90. See, e.g., Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. 967 (“First, the circumstance may not apply to every 
defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of 
murder. Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague.”); Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) (“If the sentencer 
fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the 
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.”). However, Creech only looked at one 
particular aggravating circumstance, not whether the scheme itself failed to whittle down the death-
eligible class enough. 
 91. State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 790 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1054 (2018). 
 92. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474 (“Our precedents make clear that a State’s capital sentencing 
scheme also must ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.’”) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)). 
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decisions have turned on particular, individual aggravating circumstances, 
which may or may not have narrowed the class of offenders eligible for death 
sentences, does not mean that the Court has given its blessing to statutory 
schemes with an all-encompassing menagerie of aggravating factors. 
The Arizona Supreme Court placed form over substance in its decision in 
State v. Hidalgo.93 Hidalgo presented evidence showing that, due to Arizona’s 
expansive list of aggravating circumstances, nearly ninety-nine percent of first 
degree murders had at least one aggravating circumstance, making them death-
eligible.94 However, as acknowledged by the court, prosecutors only sought the 
death penalty in around ten percent of cases.95 The court further reasoned that 
“[o]bserving that at least one of several aggravating circumstances could apply 
to nearly every murder is not the same as saying that a particular aggravating 
circumstance is present in every murder.”96 
While it denied Hidalgo’s petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision was accompanied—curiously—by a statement respecting the 
denial of certiorari written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.97 The statement considered the various ways in which 
Arizona’s statutory set-up could perform the required narrowing function. First, 
Arizona could “narrow the definition of capital offenses” such that the definition 
for capital murder was necessarily smaller than the definition for first-degree 
murder.98 Arizona did not opt to go this route, however.99 
Instead, Arizona chose to meet the narrowing requirement by setting forth 
aggravating factors which function to elevate a non-death-eligible murder to a 
death-eligible one.100 Justice Breyer’s statement further noted that the Arizona 
Supreme Court set out five grounds which it believed met the narrowing 
requirement:  
They were: (1) Arizona’s first-degree murder statute; (2) the “identified 
aggravating circumstances”; (3) the fact that the State must prove “one or more” 
of the “alleged aggravating circumstances” “beyond a reasonable doubt”; (4) the 
existence of “mandatory appellate review”; and (5) Arizona’s statutory 
 
 93. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783. 
 94. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017), 
2017 WL 3531089 (U.S.) (“‘[V]irtually every’ person — around 99% — convicted of first-degree 
murder is eligible for the death penalty.”) 
 95. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d at 791. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S.Ct. 1054 (2018). 
 98. Id. at 1055. 
 99. Id. (“Unlike the Louisiana and Texas statutes, Arizona’s capital murder statute makes all 
first-degree murderers eligible for death and defines first-degree murder broadly to include all 
premeditated homicides along with felony murder based on 22 possible predicate felony 
offenses.”). 
 100. Id. at 1055–56. 
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provisions applicable to “individualized sentencing determinations” through 
consideration of “mitigating circumstances.”101 
Justice Breyer’s statement flatly rejected the first102 and second103 reasons. The 
statement also brushed aside the third and fourth reasons as “beside the point” 
since they did not focus on the “legislative narrowing that [the Supreme Court’s] 
precedents require.”104 Despite all of this, however, the statement ultimately 
respected the denial of certiorari—surely a huge blow for anti-death penalty 
voices. 
However, Justice Breyer’s statement left the door open for future challenges 
along these same lines. The statement acknowledged that the overwhelming 
majority of murderers in Arizona may be death-eligible.105 This fact “points to 
a possible constitutional problem.”106 The statement laid out a roadmap for 
future defendants to follow by pointing out that “[c]apital defendants may have 
the opportunity to fully develop a record with the kind of empirical evidence that 
the petitioner points to here.”107 The statement closed: “And the issue presented 
in this petition will be better suited for certiorari with such a record.”108 
This appears to be nothing if not a call for capital defendants to make every 
attempt to arm themselves with empirical studies showing that outcomes vary 
according to race. Of course, only four Justices signed onto this statement. 
Additionally, the composition of the Court has changed since the Hidalgo 
petition was denied and there is no guarantee that a record augmented with 
empirical studies, as described by Justice Breyer, would find the necessary votes. 
Still, capital defendants as well as prosecutors should now be alert to the fact—
if they weren’t already—that courts appear to be warming to the idea of utilizing 
empirical studies in properly developed records. 
At any rate, Arizona’s formalistic statutory set-up is allowed to live on, 
despite performing no substantial (or indeed, any) narrowing function at the 
eligibility phase. The Arizona Supreme Court even recognized that the use of 
 
 101. Id. at 1057. 
 102. Hidalgo, 138 S.Ct. at 1057 (2018) (“We have considered (and rejected) the first of these 
other ways since Arizona’s first-degree murder statute does not “provid[e] for categorical 
narrowing at the definition stage.”) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)). 
 103. Id. (“What about the second way—that is, narrowing by means of the ‘statutory 
aggravators’? Again, the Arizona Supreme Court assumed that those factors do not, in fact, narrow 
the class of death-eligible first-degree murder defendants. Instead it assumed that ‘Hidalgo is right 
in his factual assertion that nearly every charged first degree murder could support at least one 
aggravating circumstance.’ That assumption, without more, would seem to deny the constitutional 
need to ‘genuinely’ narrow the class of death-eligible defendants.”) (emphasis added) (quoting 
State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 791 (Ariz. 2017)). 
 104. Hidalgo, 138 S.Ct. at 1057 (2018). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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aggravating circumstances is a means to the end of genuinely narrowing the 
death-eligible class, not an end in and of itself.109 However, it is difficult if not 
impossible to view such a step a part of a procedure which “minimize[s] the risk 
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”110 A defendant going through such a 
scheme is no differently placed than the defendant in Furman. Indeed, Justice 
Stewart’s words apply just as readily to Hidalgo as they did to Furman: “of all 
the people convicted of [murder]. . . many just as reprehensible as these, the 
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the 
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”111 The fact that there is no single 
overly broad or vague aggravating circumstance in Arizona does not mean that 
Arizona’s statutory set up is not guilty of subjecting individuals to the machinery 
of death in an unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious fashion. 
B. Current Capital Sentencing Schemes Fail to Direct Sentencing Discretion 
By failing to suitably direct the discretion of prosecutors and juries, capital 
sentencing schemes today allow some of our nation’s most shameful practices 
to surface within the death penalty context. The racial bias inherent in the 
machinery of death is an area often studied.112 Commentators have also 
acknowledged the inherent tension between uniformity and flexibility when it 
comes to jury verdicts in death penalty cases.113 While the Supreme Court has 
“decline[d] to assume that what is unexplained is invidious,”114 it is clear that 
invidiousness is part of the system. 
A New Yorker article from 2016 makes this point in a way that legal 
scholarship often cannot.115 The article relates shocking stories of two different 
death penalty cases: one in Georgia and another in Texas.116 In the Georgia case, 
Kenneth Fults—an African-American man—was sentenced to death for the 
murder of his white neighbor.117 One of the jurors in the case, a white male who 
 
 109. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d at 791. See also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245 (1988). 
 110. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). 
 111. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 112. See John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital 
Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 487, 494, 546, 560 (2017); Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and 
Class Structures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1431–33 (2016); Shatz & 
Dalton, supra note 60 at 1233, 1239. 
 113. Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty, the Tension between Individualized 
Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 46 (1995). 
 114. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). 
 115. Lincoln Caplan, Racial Discrimination and Capital Punishment: The Indefensible Death 
Sentence of Duane Buck, NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/racial-discrimination-and-capital-punishment-the-indefensible-death-sentence-of-duane-
buck [https://perma.cc/5CA7-VJ2P] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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indicated to the court during voir dire that his views on race would not prevent 
him from giving the defendant a fair trial, was later quoted by an investigator 
working on the defendant’s appeal: “I don’t know if he ever killed anybody, but 
that nigger got just what should have happened. Once he pled guilty, I knew I 
would vote for the death penalty because that’s what that nigger deserved.”118 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this appeal as it was procedurally barred.119 While 
discretion is part and parcel of the criminal justice system, it is clear that the 
discretion left to the jury in Fults’ case was not sufficiently narrowed to prohibit 
overt racist sentiments from helping to condemn the defendant. While an 
appellate court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a trier of fact to 
conclude that an aggravating circumstance existed,120 the fact remains that the 
jury that actually made this determination exhibited overt racist sentiments. This 
same jury would have been charged with considering mitigating evidence. While 
Fults was certainly guilty of committing a gruesome crime spree and could have 
been sentenced to death on the evidence,121 nothing redeems the process that 
ultimately condemned him. 
Prosecutors also exercise their discretion, and often do so in a way that 
suggests they do more narrowing work than the aggravating statutes do. One 
Missouri study found that  
[D]iscretionary choices by prosecutors eliminated about 53.7% of the 
intentional-homicide cases from the [first-degree murder] category, whereas the 
statute eliminated only about 15.5% of the cases from the [first-degree murder] 
category. Thus, prosecutors do about 3.5 times more “work” than the statute in 
narrowing the class of intentional-homicide cases to yield [first-degree murder] 
convictions.122 
The study is unique in that it examines the prosecutor’s discretion in whether to 
bring charges as first- or second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, and 
found that roughly 62.3% of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter 
charges could have been brought as first-degree murder charges.123 The authors 
also conclude that roughly ninety percent of the first-degree murder-eligible 
non-capital cases studied would have been death-eligible in Missouri.124 
Prosecutorial discretion will always be a part of the criminal justice system, but 
this discretion should be more narrowed and directed than it currently is. 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Fults v. Warden, 764 F.3d 1311, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 120. Fults v. State, 548 S.E.2d 315, 319 (Ga. 2001). 
 121. Id. at 318–19. 
 122. Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial 
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ L. REV. 305, 317–18 (2009). 
 123. Id. at 315–16. 
 124. Id. at 319. 
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C. Overly Broad Capital Sentencing Schemes do not Identify a Heightened 
Punishment for Increased Culpability 
To the extent that aggravating factor schemes are vague or do not identify 
factors that are indicative of a sufficiently high degree of culpability, they do not 
justify the heightened punishment of death. In some instances, there is a danger 
of overlap between multiple aggravators or between an aggravator and an 
element of the crime itself. In other instances, the explosion of aggravating 
factors in some states may be motivated by political considerations, such as 
being “tough on crime” or the perceived need to respond to a high-profile 
murder. While American politicians should ultimately be held accountable by 
their constituents, this should not permit the stripping away of criminal 
defendants’ rights. 
The reality that the existence of some aggravators is correlated with the 
existence of others is problematic. Studies have suggested that juries may resort 
to a sort of box-checking when it comes to identifying aggravating factors in 
capital murder cases.125 In many jurisdictions, for example, contract killings 
almost necessarily implicate two aggravators.126 Further, jurisdictions that have 
one aggravator for “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” murders and another for “cold, 
calculated, and premeditated” ones risk unfairly piling on the absolute number 
of aggravators against a defendant.127 Even though such aggravators are 
typically required to have limiting constructions, it is difficult to see how a 
murder that satisfies one would not satisfy the other. In such a case, the same 
criminal act can run afoul of two similar aggravators. While this does not 
necessarily make the murder twice as aggravated, it gives jurors an opportunity 
to come to that very conclusion. 
In other instances, the adoption of aggravating factors seems less about the 
culpability of a particular class of murderers than whether a particular murder 
was a high-profile one. A prime example of this phenomenon is the addition of 
terrorism-related concerns after September 11, 2001.128 Similar patterns exist 
for school shootings, domestic violence, and child abuse.129 Adding to ever-
expanding lists of aggravators might help to signal outrage at a particular crime. 
However, it can be argued that any unjustified, premeditated murder—and 
therefore any murder where the judicial system would need to worry about the 
death penalty—is horrible. However, the task of aggravating factor schemes is 
 
 125. See Bentele and Bowers, supra note 51. 
 126. For example, compare MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2)(4) and MO. REV. STAT. § 
565.032(2)(6) with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(4) (West 2017) and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200.033(6) (West 2017). 
 127. FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141(6)(h) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141(6)(i) (West 
2017). 
 128. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of 
the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2006). 
 129. Id. at 30–31. 
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not to identify whether society is outraged by a particular killing; its task is to 
identify the worst of the worst offenders who then receive the worst of the worst 
punishment. Additionally, while each individual addition to an aggravator 
scheme might be justified, that justification only works for the individual trees, 
not the forest that some of these schemes have become. What holds for the 
individual may not, and in this case does not, hold in the aggregate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A constitutional capital sentencing scheme must provide a way to 
“genuinely narrow” the class of those eligible for the death penalty and must 
“reasonably justify” imposing a more severe sentence compared to others found 
guilty of murder. It must do so in a way that avoids both arbitrariness and 
invidious discrimination. Many schemes as they exist today fail to live up to 
Furman’s lofty standards. At their worst, they are arbitrary, all-encompassing, 
discriminatory, and ever-growing Hydras which erode the constitutional rights 
of criminal defendants. As they exist today, state aggravating factor schemes are 
just as arbitrary and capricious as those struck down in Furman. In order to save 
their aggravating factor schemes, states need to reform them. 
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